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Abstract 
This article uses panel data from 94 LGAs in Tanzania mainland over the period 2005/06 to 
2009/10, to examine the impact of Fiscal Decentralization on education spending and provision 
of quality education. Using local share of total fiscal expenditure as a proxy for fiscal 
decentralization, this article concludes that Fiscal Decentralization exerts significant impact on 
education spending and quality of education in Tanzania.  
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1.0 Introduction 
This study examines the impact of fiscal decentralization on education spending and provision of 
quality education in Tanzania by using panel data econometrics for the period between 2004/05 
and 2009/10. Fiscal decentralization involves decentralization of local government finances by 
introducing equitable and transparent revenue and capital development grants from central 
government to local government authorities. Fiscal decentralization also involves giving local 
government authorities financial powers to raise appro riate local revenues. 
The government of Tanzania has been pursuing unprecedented reforms in local government 
since 1990s, of which fiscal decentralization constitute an integral part of wider decentralization 
program. Local government reform, launched in 1998 aimed at transferring resources from 
central to local government’s spending on public servic s such as education. It also involved 
devolution of power in an endeavor to create more autonomy at the grassroots level. Despite all 
these reforms, there is no empirical study that has systematically examined the nexus between 
fiscal decentralization and quality of education/education spending,  see for example, Fjeldstad, 
(2001), Fjeldstad et al (2002), Mbelle (2008).  
The discussion on fiscal decentralization and its impact on public spending is not new but up to 
now there is no consensus on the magnitude and direction of the impact of fiscal decentralization 
on spending, (Busemeyer, 2007). The impact of fiscal decentralization on public spending varies 
depending on the distribution of spending across levels of government.  Busemeyer (2007) 
developed a simple model to show that local competition n the provision of local/regional public 
goods (e.g. education) can result in higher spending. However, when public goods are provided 
at the national level, fiscal decentralization encourages local policy pre-emption, thus lowering 
spending, Busemeyer (2007).  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature by using panel data econometrics. It exploits 
dataset from 94 LGAs in Tanzania mainland over the period between 2005/06 and 2009/10.  
Empirically, panel data econometrics has several appe ling features compared with either cross 
section or time series econometrics. First, panel data contain information on both the inter-
temporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities, and therefore it is capable of controlling 
the effects of unobservable.  Second, Hsiao (2005) argues that panel data generates more 
accurate predictions for individual outcomes by pooling the data rather than generating 
predictions of individual outcomes using the data on the individual in question.  
The econometric results show that Fiscal Decentralization exerts significant impact on education 
spending and quality of education in Tanzania. The remainder of this article is organized as 
follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on fiscal decentralization paying particular attention on 
the link between fiscal decentralization and spending in education.  Section 3 presents an 
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2.0 Literature Review 
The conceptual framework of fiscal decentralization is largely based on contributions by Tiebout 
(1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972). Tiebout (1956) argues that fiscal decentralization 
enhances efficiency in the local public sector with mobility of households providing the 
disciplining market force. Fiscal decentralization is a powerful channel for matching the 
provision of public services which are commensurate to the preferences of citizens. Oates (1972) 
argues that, local governments are best positioned to provide local public services since they can 
accommodate differences in tastes; local governments have an information advantage on tastes 
over central government. In an attempt to provide an efficient allocation of local public services 
means that local governments provide services up to the point where the marginal utility of the 
last unit of services for which citizens are willing to pay is just equal to its marginal benefits. 
This implies that local governments are obliged to generate revenues to match citizens’ 
preferences on expenditures.  
Indeed, the decentralized system of tax collection would be more likely to make spending 
decisions at the grass root level more compatible with available resources. The decentralized 
system of tax collection promotes accountability and responsibility as well as the efficient 
provision of local public goods. Fiscal decentraliztion also encourages fiscal autonomy and tax 
competition among localities. In fact, the literature on fiscal federalism suggests that expenditure 
assignment should precede tax assignment. The reasons behind is that tax assignment is 
generally guided by expenditure requirement of different levels of government and these cannot 
be worked out in advance of expenditure responsibilities. Absence of tax assignment would 
result in dependence on the federal government by lower levels of government.  
2.2 Empirical Literature  
Empirical evidence on the effects of decentralized education spending has been mixed, with 
positive results reported by Barankay and Lockwood (2007) for Switzerland and Skoufias and 
Shapiro (2006) for Mexico, but negative results obtained by Di Gropello (2002) for Chile, and 
more broadly for Latin American countries (Glewwe, 2002). Most of the earlier studies report a 
negative association between fiscal decentralisation and public spending (Nelson 1987; Marlow 
1988; Grossmann1989;, but others find no robust effect of fiscal decentralisation on spending 
(Oates 1985 and  Anderson 1998). Akai and Tananta (2007), show that decentralization in 
education finance have positive effects on students’ performance through improvement in the 
allocation of educational resources. However, it may deteriorate equity in educational resources 
among districts and result in low educational outcome. The negative effect of decentralization is 
larger in primary than in secondary education because of large marginal products of education 
and/or high complementarities among districts in prma y education. 
Skira, (2006) postulates that expenditure decentralization improves education output by 
increasing the average years of primary school in the total population, decreasing the percentage 
of no schooling in the total population, decreasing the dropout rate in primary school, decreasing 
the repetition rate in primary school, increasing the percentage of primary school attained in the 
total population and increasing the percentage of secondary school attained in the total 
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population. The log of expenditure decentralization is significant in all the regressions except 
when the percentage of primary school attained in the total population is the dependent variable. 
Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009) found that fiscal decentralization has no significant impact on 
key inputs into secondary education, such as computers but has a significant positive impact on 
examination results in Russian regions. These results remain stable even after controlling for key 
observable inputs and regional government spending on education. Luo and Chen  (2010) 
examines the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public provision in china and 
found negative effect of fiscal decentralization on public education provision which was highest 
in Central and West China.   
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Econometric Model for fiscal decentralization and quality of public education 
 
In this paper, we use two econometric models to estimate the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
the provision of quality education. These models are dopted from Freinkman and Plekhanov 
(2009). The first model uses school inputs as a proxy f r quality education and is specified as 
follows: 
 
ititititit XDECEXPINP ελγβα ++++= 111       (1) 
where INP are the key physical inputs in district  in year t, EXP is Local government spending 
in the education per pupil, DEC is a measure of fiscal decentralization in the Local Governments  
broadly defined, X is a set of control variables, and ε is the residual. Many empirical studies 
describe fiscal decentralization as the share local expenditure to total government expenditure, 
see for examples, Oates, (1985), De Mello (2000); Jin et al (2005). Analogously, the local share 
of total of total government revenue is also applied to measure the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. We use number of classrooms as a measure of provision of quality of education. 
The choice of this proxy is dictated by data availability. Unquestionably, data on teaching 
materials, number of desk and computers would serve as good proxies for the quality of 
education but these data is not available.  
The second specification considers performance indicators as a proxy for provision of quality 
education. It is specified as follows:  
itititititit ZINPDECEXPPERF ηµδγβα +++++= 222     (2) 
Where PERF is an indicator of education performance, Z is a set of control variables, η is the 
residual, and other variables are defined as above. Th  performance indicator in education is the 
pass rate obtained by primary school candidates in national examinations. The exam pass rates 
are available for 2005 and 2010 from National Examination Council of Tanzania (NECTA).  
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3.2 Econometric Model for fiscal decentralization and Spending of Public Education 
In measuring the impact of fiscal decentralization on public education spending we used the 
econometric modeling adopted from Luo and Chen (2010). It is specified as follows: 
 
ijttijijtijtijtijtijt DCGDPXGDPPCDECY ϖυµααααα ++++++++= − 43210 ln   (3) 
Y is public education expenditure to GDP ratio. DEC stands for a measure of fiscal 
decentralization in local government.  LnGDPPC denot s per capita GDP to reflect economic 
development.  X_GDP is the Public expenditure-to-GDP in District level. DC stands for Local 
Government dummy variables, to control idiosyncrati features of each LGA. 
 
3.3 Data 
The panel data for this study is composed of 94 rural LGAs all belonging to Tanzania mainland. 
Urban councils were excluded to reduce greater variability of data by looking at population size 
and inputs, also the following LGAs were excluded from the study due to absence of data, these 
are; Longido, Bahi, Chamwino, Ludewa, Kilolo, Siha, Rorya, Nanyumbu, Mkinga, Chato, 
Arusha rural, Dodoma rural and Misenyi.  
Data were taken form the Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local 
Government Authorities (PMO-RALG, 2005-2010), as well as logintanzania.net website, 
Ministry of education and Vocation (MOEVT, 2005-2010), National Bureau of Statistic (NBS, 
2005-2010), (2005-2010) and National Examination Council of Tanzania (NECTA, 2005-
2010).We use revenue collected by each LGA as a proxy for income and hence GDP. Dividing 
by the population we get per capita income (GDP) for each jurisdiction. 
3.4 Models Estimation and Analysis 
This section presents and discusses the empirical resu ts of the models described in earlier. The 
first part presents the descriptive statistics of the data and the univariate characteristics of the 
variables. The second part presents the empirical results which include the pooled, fixed and 
random effects models of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the quality of education and 
education spending in Tanzania. The last part compares the results with other studies done in 
various parts of the world. 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics of the data. 
A normality test on the variables under study was done, and they were found to be not normally 
distributed as seen in Table 2.H in appendices two.Hence the variables were transformed to 
natural logarithms so as to make them normally distributed, since normally distributed variables 
give better results than variables which are not normally distributed. The descriptive statistics of 
the transformed data are given in Table 1.1. In general the average statistics of all variables range 
from -10.5 to 10.23, where by the growth of local government expenditure per person has the 
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lowest mean statistic while the growth of district government spending on education has the 
highest mean statistic. All the variables except the growth rate of public expenditure to GDP 
ratio, are negatively skewed indicating that, most of these values are lying on the left hand side 
of their average value while the remaining few values are on the right side of the mean.  
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Ln(DEC) Ln(EXP) Ln(INP) Ln(PERF) Ln(GDPCC) Ln(XGDP )  
Max -5.40 10.23 5.63 4.56 -4.86 4.28  
Min -7.91 6.99 2.48 2.75 -8.90 0.10  
Mean -6.45 9.21 4.65 3.93 -6.76 2.49  
Skewness -0.47 -1.09 -1.04 -0.55 -0.20 0.09  
 
In order to ensure that the study measures what is intended to measure, a number of test were 
performed. Hausman test were used to determine the appropriate model to be used. Data were 
transformed to natural logarithms to make them normally distributed. Breitung and Fischer ADF 
and LLC test were used to test for presence of unit root in the data. 
3.4.2 Unit Root Test 
Testing for panel data unit root is quite recent and many researches applying panel data still 
disregard this crucial step. This study used a battery of tests to test for the presence of unit root in 
the data. The study used the Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC), Breitung,  Fischer and Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (Fischer-ADF) tests. The LLC and Breitung test assume that the autoregressive parameters 
are common across cross sections. They use the null hypothesis of a unit root. The Fischer ADF 
test, however, allows the autoregressive to vary acoss LGA and also for individual unit root 
processes. It is computed by combining individual countries’ unit root tests to come up with a 
result that is specific to a panel. The null hypothesis is that all series contain a unit root test and 
the alternative is that at least one series in the panel contains a unit root. The results presented in 







African Journal of Economic Review, Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2013 
 
66 | P a g e 
 
Table 1.2: Panel Unit Root Test 
 LLC Breitung Fischer-ADF Order of integration 
Ln(DEC) -15.11 -3.83 49.45 I(0) 
Ln(EXP) -17.60 -3.06 63.67 I(0) 
Ln(INP) -2.54 -5.43 58.11 I(0) 
Ln(PERF) -25.15 9.45 55.93 I(0) 
Ln(GDPCC) -8.36 -10.67 75.60 I(0) 
Ln(XGDP) -8.86 7.69 60.69 I(0) 
     
 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 The impact of fiscal decentralization on quality of education. 
The estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the quality of education provision was 
done by estimating equation (1) and (2). We estimated  pooled model, fixed effects model and 
Random equation model for both equations. A pooled mo el is the most restrictive model among 
the three, since it does not allow for heterogeneity of the districts, hence it does not estimate 
district specific effects. The fixed effects model introduces heterogeneity by estimating district 
specific effects. It is an unrestricted model as it allows the intercept and other parameters to vary 
across the districts. The F-test statistic was performed to test the ability to pool data and the 
results in Table 2.A and 2.B in appendix two for equation (1) and (2) respectively, indicate that 
the null hypothesis of equality of individual effects is rejected. This means that a model with 
individual effects is better than the pooled model.  
Like the fixed effects model, the random effects model also acknowledges heterogeneity in the 
cross-section. However, it differs from the fixed effects model in the sense that the effects are 
generated by a specific distribution. Although it assumes that there is heterogeneity in the cross-
section, it does not model each effect explicitly. The LM test was performed and the null 
hypothesis of equality of the individual effects is rejected in favor of random effects specification 
as seen in Table 2.C and 2.D for equation (1) and (2) respectively.  
The Hausman statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the regressors and individual effects 
are not correlated in order to distinguish between fixed effects model and random effects model. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the random effects model will be preferred. If 
the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects model will be appropriate. The results in Table 
2.E and 2.F in appendix two show that the Hausman specification test rejects the null hypothesis 
and this indicates that district specific effects are correlated with regressors for equation (1) and 
(2) respectively. This suggests that the fixed effects model is preferred for the estimation of both 
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equation (1) and (2). Since the fixed effects model is the appropriate one for both equations (1) 
and (2), interpretation of the results will focus on the fixed effects models which are presented in 
the main text while the results of the random effects models and pooled regressions will be 
presented in the appendix one for both equations. Estimation results of the fixed effects model 
for equation (1) are presented in Table 1.3.   
The fixed effect model for equation (1) is significant as a whole, with F-statistic of 15.34. 
Moreover it has adjusted R2 of 0.59, which is moderately good. The fact that te Corr(U_i, xb)= 
0.76, supports the notion that the fixed effects model is appropriate for the estimation of equation 
(6), since it indicates that the errors are highly correlated with the regressors. Furthermore eighty 
four percent of the variance in the model is due to differences across the districts as shown by the 
value of rho which is 0.84.  Due to the fact that we are dealing with a micro panel data set the 
only diagnostic test that were conducted were the test for joint validity of fixed effects, which is 
produced by default by STATA when you run a fixed effects model. 
Table 1.3: Fixed effects model for equation (1) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(INP)   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Ln(DEC) 0.178 0.451 3.96***  0.000 
Ln(EXP) 0.065 0.028 2.36** 0.019 
Cons 5.21 0.435 11.96*** 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.59               F-statistic 15.34 
             Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
F-test that all U_i=0:        F(94, 378)=17.23               Prob>F=0.0000 
Corr(U_i, Xb)=0.7694, rho = 0.84001 
Note:*, **, *** presents 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
The F-statistics for the joint validity of fixed eff cts is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.00, hence rejecting the null hypothesis that the fix d effects are not jointly valid. Other 
diagnostic tests like testing for serial correlation were not of much interest in this case as we 
were dealing with a micro panel data set. Nevertheless we tested for the presence of 
heteroscedasticty in the panel data set, the results are presented in Table 2.G in appendix two. 
The results indicate that there is no presence of hteroscedasticity.  
Local share of government expenditure has a positive sign as expected and is statistically 
significant at 5% level of signifcance. A percentage increase in local share of government 
expenditure by a district would lead to a 17% increase in classrooms. Furthermore district 
government spending in education per pupil was alsofound to be statistically significant and 
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with the hypothesized sign. A percentage increase district government spending per pupil would 
bring a 6% increase in inputs in the education sector. 
Estimation results for equation (2) are presented in Table 1.4. The fixed effect model for 
equation (1) is significant as a whole, with F-stati ic of 8.28. Moreover it has adjusted R2 of 
0.69, which is moderately good. The fact that the Corr(U_i, xb)= 0.65, supports the notion that 
the fixed effects model is appropriate for the estima on of equation (6), since it indicates that the 
errors are correlated with the regressors. Furthermore seventy five percent of the variance in the 
model is due to differences across the districts as hown by the value of rho which is 0.75.  Due 
to the fact that we are dealing with a micro panel data set the only diagnostic test that were 
conducted were the test for joint validity of fixed effects, which is produced by default by 
STATA when you run a fixed effects model.  
The F-statistics for the joint validity of fixed eff cts is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.00, hence rejecting the null hypothesis that the fix d effects are not jointly valid. Other 
diagnostic tests like testing for serial correlation were not of much interest in this case as we 
were dealing with a micro panel data set. Nevertheless we tested for the presence of 
heteroscedasticty in the panel data set, the results are presented in Table 2.H in appendix two. 
The results indicate that there is no presence of hteroscedasticity.  
All the variables in equation (2) were found to have the hypothesized signs according to the 
theory. The local share of government expenditure was found to be positive and statistically 
significant at 5%. A percentage increase in the local share of government expenditure by a 
district would lead to 18% increase in the pass rate. Moreover district government spending in 
education per pupil was found to be positive and statistically significant. But it was found to be 
fairly significant at 10% level of significance. A percentage increase in district government 
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Table 1.4: Fixed Effects Model  
Dependent Variable: Ln(PERF)   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Ln(DEC) 0.184 0.060 3.02** 0.003 
Ln(EXP) 0.068 0.037 1.82* 0.069 
Ln(INP) 0.063 0.024 2.63** 0.005 
St_ratio -0.562 0.251 -2.23** 0.026 
Cons 4.487 0.588 7.63***  0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.69     F-statistic 8.28 
      Prob(F-statistic) 0.003 
    
F-test that all U_i=0    F(94,378)=2.82       Prob>F=0.0000 
Corr (U_i, Xb)= 0.6562, rho= 0.7561 
Note:*, **, *** presents 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
The student teacher ratio (st_ratio), was found to be statistically significant and negative, a 
percentage increase in the number of pupils in relation to the teachers available would bring 
about a 5.6 percent decrease in the pass rate. Neverth less the number of inputs in the 
educational sector also was found to be statistically significant and positive. A percentage 
increase in the number of class rooms would lead to a 6.3% increase in the pass rates.   
Looking at the estimation results for equation (1) and (2), we see that both inputs in education 
and education performance indicators are positively inf uenced by fiscal decentralization. Hence 
this implies that fiscal decentralization has positive impact in quality of education.  
 
3.5.2 Impact of fiscal decentralization on education spending 
The estimation of the impact of fiscal decentralization on education spending was done by 
estimating equation (3). We estimated a pooled model, fix d effects model and Random equation 
model for equation (3). A pooled model is the most re trictive model among the three, since it 
does not allow for heterogeneity of the districts, hence it does not estimate district specific 
effects. The fixed effects model introduces heterogneity by estimating district specific effects. It 
is an unrestricted model as it allows the intercept and other parameters to vary across the 
districts. The F-test statistic was performed to test he ability to pool data and the results in Table 
1.5 indicate that the null hypothesis of equality of individual effects is not rejected. This was also 
supported by the LM test which indicated that the pooled model is preferable to the random 
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effects model. Hence the interpretation of the results will concentrate on the pooled regression 
results on the second column.   
Table 1.5: Estimation results for equation 3 
Variable Pooled Regression Fixed effects Random effects 
Constant  0.151 (1.85)*  0.221 (3.22)**  0.159 (1.94)* 
Ln(DEC)  0.740 (7.40)***  0.938 (6.86)***  0.753 (7.66)*** 
Ln(GDPPC) -0.613 (3.59)** -0.877 (2.98)** -0.045 (3.73)*** 
Ln(XGDP)  0.191 (0.08)  0.129 (0.30)  0.134 (1.97)* 
DC  1.113 (3.96)*** -  1.072 (2.56)** 
Adjusted R2  0.69  0.72  0.70 
Chow test 45.06***   
Hausman test    
LM test 279.456***   
    
Note:*, **, *** presents 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively, the standard errors 
reported in the brackets are robust standard errors to take care of heteroscedasticity. 
From the results in Table 1.5, we see that the rate of growth of local government expenditure per 
person which has been used as a measure of fiscal de entralization is significant and has a 
positive effect on public education expenditure to GDP ratio. A percentage increase in local 
government expenditure per person will lead to 74 percent increase in public education 
expenditure to GDP ratio. Hence, meaning that Fiscal decentralization brings about an increase 
in Education spending.  
Moreover in control variables, GDP per capita signif cantly decreases education provision at 5% 
significance level, a percentage increase in GDP per capita will lead to a 61 percent decrease in 
education spending, which indicates that, although economic development could enhance 
education, but to accelerate economic development, local government over-invest in 
infrastructure, while under-invest in education. Public expenditure-to-GDP ratio is another 
important control variable, but we do not make detail d analysis here as it was found to be not 
statistically significant. City council dummy variable significantly reduces education provision, 
which indicates that "education in capital city is better" is not correct. A district council being a 
city council reduces education expenditure by 1.1. This may be attributed to the fact that in city 
councils other development projects have high priority rather than investment in education.  
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3.5.3 Comparison with other studies 
The results obtained in this study are consistent to what Oates (1972), who concluded that fiscal 
decentralization had a positive effect on the quality of public service provision, including 
education. Oates (1972) reiterates that this is no urprise by any means since local governments 
may have superior knowledge of local preferences and needs, thus be able to target public 
spending better. 
Furthermore the results of this study are consistent to what Barankay and Lockwood (2007) for 
Switzerland and Skoufias and Shapiro (2006) for Mexico, who concluded that fiscal 
decentralization, has a positive effect on education spending. This is contrary to what Di 
Gropello (2002) for Chile and more broadly for latin America by Glewwe (2002), who 
concluded that fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on education spending. 
Moreover, the study is also consistent with Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009), who concluded 
that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive effect on the quality of education spending. 
They found fiscal decentralization to have a positive effect on average examination results which 
they used as a performance indicator. 
 
4.0 Concluding Remarks 
This study analyzed the impact fiscal decentralization on the quality of education provision and 
education spending in Tanzania over the period of 2005 to 2009. The study used panel data 
analysis techniques in the estimation of the data. The data were tested for stationarity using a 
battery of tests that included Levin, Lin and Chu test, Breitung test and Fischer ADF test, which 
revealed that the variables were stationary, hence could be estimated using Ordinary least 
squares. 
The equations in this study were estimated using the three common panel data techniques, which 
are pooled regressions, fixed effects and random effects models. The chow F-statistic, Hausman 
test and Breusch-Pagan LM test were used to determin  odeling techniques. The fixed effects 
model and pooled regression models were found to be appropriate for the impact of fiscal 
decentralization on quality of education provision a d impact of fiscal decentralization on 
education spending respectively. The results reveald that fiscal decentralization has a positive 
effect on the quality of education provision and education spending. 
The study revealed that fiscal decentralization hasa positive effect on both the quality of 
education provision and education spending, hence the government may enhance further 
decentralization in Tanzania. This will lead local governments to have more autonomy on fiscal 
matters, hence make them more accountable. Fiscal decentralization would reduce district 
council’s dependency on central government. For fiscal decentralization to be successful there 
must be willingness on the part of the central government to share power with lower tiers of 
governments.  
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Indicators of fiscal decentralization are numerous. Zhang and Zou (1998) use the provincial 
government budget expenditure per person (in-budget and off-budget) over the government's 
total expenditure per person as proxy for fiscal decentralization. Lin and Liu (2000) use marginal 
sharing rate of provincial government in budget revenue of the province to measure fiscal 
decentralization. Further research on fiscal decentralization in Tanzania should take into account 
these indicators. Furthermore our study could not icorporate other control variables like school 
resources, organization of schooling, student and family characteristics, the degree of 
competition across schools when looking at the impact fiscal decentralization on the quality of 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Panel data models 
Table 1.A: Random effects model for equation (1) 
 
Dependent Variable: Ln(INP)   
Method: Random effects model   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z-Statistic Prob.  
Ln(DEC) 0.328 0.045 7.59***  0.000 
Ln(EXP) 0.035 0.028 1.22 0.224 
Cons 6.457 0.430 14.99*** 0.000 
R-squared 0.51     Wald chi2(2) 67.11 
      Prob(Wald chi2) 0.000 
Corr(U_i, Xb)=0; rho = 0.7339 
 
Table 1.B: Pooled model for equation (1) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(INP)   
Method: Pooled model   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Ln(EXP) 0.05 0.05 1.14 0.25 
Ln(DEC) 0.81 0.45 18.02*** 0.00 
Cons 6.457 0.430 14.99*** 0.000 
R-squared 0.55     F-statistic 162.32 















African Journal of Economic Review, Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2013 
 
77 | P a g e 
 
Table 1.C: Pooled model for equation (2) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(PERF)   
Method: Pooled model   
 
  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Ln(DEC) 0.026 0.035 0.76 0.450 
Ln(EXP) 0.107 0.039 2.76** 0.006 
Ln(INP) 0.014 0.006 2.09** 0.021 
St_ratio -0.131 0.028 -4.72***  0.000 
Cons 2.779 0.431 6.45***  0.000 
R-squared 0.61     F-statistic 172.31 
      Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
 
Table 1.D: Random effects model for equation (2) 
Dependent Variable: Ln(PERF)   
Method: Random  effects model   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Z-Statistic Prob.  
Ln(DEC) 0.134 0.041 0.82 0.412 
Ln(EXP) 0.097 0.036 2.73** 0.006 
Ln(INP) 0.028 0.017 1.64  
St_ratio -0.362 0.127 -2.85***  0.001 
Cons 3.256 0.452 7.20***  0.000 
R-squared 0.62     Wald chi2(2) 8.93 
      Prob(Wald chi2) 0.015 
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Appendix 2: Diagnostic Tests 
 
Table 2.A: Chow Test for equation (1) 
 
F- test 10% critical value 
 





Ho: Pooled model is appropriate 
 
Table 2.B: Chow Test for equation (2) 
 
F- test 10% critical value 
 





Ho: Pooled model is appropriate 
 









Ho: Pooled model is appropriate 
 









Ho: Pooled model is appropriate 
 









Ho: Random effects are appropriate 
 









Ho: Random effects are appropriate 
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Table 2.H: Test for multivariate normality: Doornik  Hansen Test 
Test statistic(Chi2) Prob>Chi2 
10.150 0.0025 
Ho: The variables are normally distributed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
